Skip to content
Mac Mathews Consulting logo

Published on · 4 min read

Invoice fraud: how it actually works

A perfectly credible email, bank details that change, a payment gone. The real mechanism behind the scam that drains small-business accounts, the signals that should raise an alarm, and the two-minute rule that stops it.

Ransomware makes the headlines. Invoice fraud quietly makes the bankruptcies.

It requires no malicious software and no particular technical skill. It exploits what works best inside a company: trust, routine, and the wish to do things properly and quickly.

The most common scenario

It does not start with a suspicious email. It starts with a compromised mailbox — your supplier’s, not yours.

The attacker gets in, often thanks to a password reused elsewhere and recovered from a data breach. Then they do nothing. They read. For weeks they watch the exchanges, learn the usual amounts, the tone, the accountant’s first name, the rhythm of invoicing.

When the time comes, they step into a conversation that is already running, from the supplier’s legitimate address, with the thread quoted underneath. The message announces a change of bank details, for the invoice you were expecting, in the amount you were expecting.

Nothing feels wrong. That is precisely the problem.

The variants

CEO fraud. A message that appears to come from the director requests an urgent, confidential transfer, often tied to a sensitive deal: do not call me, I am in a meeting. Urgency and authority switch off the instinct to check.

The fake supplier. A letter or an email announces a change of bank, with impeccable-looking details and a correct logo. It sometimes arrives by post, on headed paper.

The fraudulent bank adviser. A call, with your branch’s real number displayed on screen — caller ID is trivially spoofed. You are asked to approve an operation in your banking app to block a fraud in progress. The approval in fact authorises the attacker’s transfer.

Why it works

Because these attacks contain none of the signals people are taught to spot. No spelling mistakes, no exotic address, no dubious attachment. The email genuinely comes from the supplier’s domain, since the account has been compromised.

And because they rely on three human levers: urgency, which prevents thought; authority, which discourages questioning; and routine, which makes one more transfer look like all the previous ones.

The rule that stops it

One single measure can prevent most of these scams, and it is free:

Any change of bank details is verified by a phone call, to a number you already had — never the one given in the message.

Two minutes, a number taken from your past invoices or your contact file, and one simple question: have you changed bank? If the attacker controls the mailbox, they do not control the phone line.

Three points that matter. Do not reply to the message to ask for confirmation: the reply reaches the attacker. Do not use the number given in the email or on the new bank details. And apply the rule even when the request comes from the director — it is the director who must insist on it, which spares the accountant from having to dare.

What you build around it

A short written procedure: who may order a payment, above what amount a second approval is required, and how a change of bank details is verified. Half a page pinned near the accounts desk beats a memo buried in a folder.

Two-factor authentication on email. It is what prevents your own mailbox from becoming the starting point of the attack against your clients. If one piece of advice were to be kept from this article, it would be that one.

Passwords that are never reused, through a password manager. The initial compromise almost always comes from a password recovered in a breach on another service.

Domain authentication records — SPF, DKIM, DMARC — which prevent anyone from using your domain name to write to your clients. It is technical, it is configured once, and it protects your reputation as much as your cash.

If the payment has already gone

The first few hours count more than everything that follows.

Call your bank immediately and ask for a recall of funds. If the money has not yet been withdrawn from the receiving account, it can sometimes be frozen.

File a complaint without delay, with the original emails — forwarded as attachments, not copied and pasted: the technical headers matter.

Delete nothing and do not tidy up the mailbox concerned. Warn the supplier whose account was probably compromised: they often have no idea they are the starting point, and their other clients are being targeted right now.

Tell your teams the same day. A successful attempt is generally followed by others, on the same pattern.

In one sentence

No firewall, no antivirus and no backup stops a payment deliberately approved by an employee acting in good faith. What stops it is a phone call to a known number — and a management team that has said clearly that nobody will ever be blamed for taking those two minutes.